You should try and read and listen to things a bit more closely if you want to make a claim to understanding and denigrate my comprehension.  You understand something, but you clearly have looked at neither the bylaws nor the UAW constitution in a way that would generate a correct understanding.  I gave short answers because, with vague documents like a constitution, good interpretation can take a lot of work in ambiguous cases.  So here is the work that you would have needed to do in order to come up with a good understanding of the bylaws, as opposed to the understanding you have presented us with, which reflects an incomplete and sloppy reading of the relevant documents.

1. Take a look at the full article on membership meetings and pay attention to how separate sections are or are not related to each other.  You’ll notice, for example, that while regular membership and statewide membership meetings both refer to notification protocol as listed in Section 3, and regular meetings (Sec. 3) have a quorum protocol elaborated in Sec 4, while special meetings have a quorum protocol listed in Sec 5, campus unit meetings refer to neither quorum nor notification protocols.  This is because, obviously, a campus unit meeting should not, by definition, meet the requirements for a statewide meeting.  In the first instance, a campus unit meeting will not meet the threshold of campus representation (50%) stipulated for regular and special statewide meetings.  

If one looks at campus local bylaws (mine is UCLA) one will see that here specific provisions are made for notification and the calling of special campus unit meetings.  The reason for this is because such procedures are not elaborated in the Local’s bylaws and do not fall within their scope.

Further, if one further interrogates the organization of the constitution, one will note that the quorum provision for regular statewide meetings follows Sec 3 and is listed in Sec 4, while quorum for special statewide meetings is located in Sec 5.  What this suggests is that one should not assume that Sec 4 applies to all potential membership meeting types, but only that type immediately prior to it (and definitely not the section immediately after it).  This is reinforced by the fact that notification procedures for both meetings, stipulated in Section 3, are explicitly referenced when they apply to later Sections (c.f Sec 5, or specific provisions for notification enumerated in Campus Unit Bylaws) 

Given this logic, there is no reason to assume that Sec 7 applies to more than Sec 6, given the limited scope of Sec 4 and the practice of citation used with Sec 3 and what is implied by the repetition of the quorum requirement in Sec 4 and Sec 5.

If we were to apply your logic of interpretation, Sec 4 would apply to Sec 3, Sec 5, and Sec 6, even though this is redundant for Sec 3 and absurd for Sec 6.  Further, the notification requirement in Sec 3 would apply to Sec 5 and 6, even though this would cause a redundancy is Sec 5 and would override campus specific notification provisions made in campus unit bylaws for campus unit membership meetings (covered in Sec 6).

If one uses my reading, whereby Section 4 and Section 7 apply only to those Sections directly preceding them unless otherwise cited, none of these absurdities are generated.

We can complicate this reading further by looking at Articles 14 and 15, referring to elections, which are analogous to  statewide membership meetings.  Doing so cuts a few ways.  On the one hand, Article 15 (Campus Unit Elections) makes explicit reference to the academic year while Article 14 does not.  On the other hand, Article 14 says special elections (notice the isomorphism with special membership meetings) cannot be called during June, July, August, and September.  Now if we were to draw out this restriction and apply it to special membership meetings, we would have a ban on meetings being called in June, July, August, and September.  One will note that our meeting was held in May.

But I would suggest that such an inference would be unwise, because it appears to me that the restriction on calling a special statewide meeting are simply those enumerated in Article 4 Section 3, which limits the meetings not in terms of date but in terms of authority to convene the meeting (Exec Board, Joint Council, or Membership Petition as conforms to the quorum protocols of a statewide meeting)

2.  The Constitution of Local 2865 is bounded by the UAW constitution, which confines application for membership, in Article 6 Section 2, to “actual workers in and around the workplace.”  This did not apply to Sayil Camacho, who was neither a graduate student nor a student-worker.  As a note, my strict reading of membership would be current graduate students, local union employees, and employees who fall under the title of our local, which includes undergraduate tutors.

Now we need to examine your false analogy.  Jordan Brocious was allowed to attend a meeting.  On his own account, as offered at the statewide meeting, he was under the express understanding that his membership would only take effect once he entered as a student in the Fall of the relevant term (which was, I believe, something like 3 years ago), and that his membership would be postdated to this effect.

If you return to Article 4, you will note that no provision is made for who can attend a meeting.  Jordan certainly attended a meeting.  I am not under the impression that he voted or ran for office or exercised any privilege restricted to the membership during this meeting.  At the most recent statewide meeting, there were a number of parties in attendance who were not members.  Clearly, membership is nowhere stipulated as a requirement for attendance, though it is a requirement for voting, running for office, and being employed by the union.

3A.  Sorry about the misnumbering.  This is not stupid.  If Sayil Camacho signed up for membership in mid January, and the argument is that she could do so because she was an incoming student, it must be the case that she was admitted as a student in January.  If this is not true, then this justification for granting her membership is a fabrication.  I could submit an application to Western Michigan right now.  Is that grounds for me to sign up in their union because I’m an incoming graduate student?  

Based on my understanding of admissions procedure, it is highly unlikely Sayil was admitted in January, and as such it is highly unlikely that the claimed grounds for admitting her as a member (being an incoming student) existed at the time she filled out a membership card.  This is to sidestep the question of whether or not being an incoming student is sufficient grounds for being a member.  I, of course, do not think being an incoming student entitles one to membership, as I elaborated above.  

Maybe you augured her acceptance in January, just as you later augur whether or not Charlie Eaton will ever be a TA.  If so I commend your soothsaying powers.  Of course, pointing out this potential fabrication is a relatively minor issue compared with her illegal hiring by our former Executive Officers.  What is most questionable here is ultimately not Sayil’s behavior, but the abrogation of the fiduciary responsibilities of our Executive Board and Elections Officers in making decisions which are not in conformity with our bylaws.

3B. This last point applies directly to what you say here.  Insofar as we are dealing with a dis-analogy in the case of Jordan Brocious, Sayil Camacho, and the question of eligibility for elected office, your attempt to cast Adam Hefty’s advice as partisan or strategic is clearly nothing more than hot air.  Jordan filled out a membership form and attended a meeting in advance of being a graduate student for the forthcoming fall term a few years ago; Sayil Camacho filled out a membership form and ran for elected office in advance of being a graduate student for the forthcoming fall term a few months ago.  

Any reasonable person can see that there is nothing similar about the eligibility question in these two cases.  Jordan was running for an E board office which requires a minimum of 1 year of continues membership, Sayil for one which requires 90 days (Article 16).  Jordan filled out his form in similar circumstances to Sayil but did not run for election in similar circumstances.  Further, based on his personal account, the way his membership was processed at the time of filling out his membership application was not the same as Sayil’s.  In fact, based on a reading of the UAW constitution, his account of how his application was processed is in conformity with our local’s rules while Sayil Camacho’s application was not so processed.

Because Adam Hefty was giving advice on different issues with different evidential grounds, partisan intent is not at all necessary for inferring why he made differing recommendations for differing situations.  Any elections official who treated these cases as the same would be being partisan.  Treating them as distinct would be being honest and truthful.

4.  Charlie Eaton qualifies for membership on the basis of our bylaws.  Sayil Camacho does not.  Your prognostications on him never in the future being a TA are nothing more than fortune telling.  I am going to stick to the rules here, and not get in to theoretical debates about whether or not conforming to the rules qualifies Charlie (in a moral sense) to hold office.  It qualifies him in a legal sense and that is what I am talking about here, law.

Now, I know you didn’t fully understand the bylaws (though you certainly understood them to some degree), but have you understood me?  If you have, then hopefully you now have a better understanding of the bylaws.  If you disagree with the hermeneutic techniques I applied, I would love to see how you would generate an interpretation which does not create absurdities and redundancies in the document in question.

Thanks for reading,

Zachary Williams

Hello BylawsReader!It is really nice to see that you have become interested in the union in the past few months, perhapseven going so far as to attend a campus membership meeting.

YOU’RE WRONG ON AWDU RUNNING INELIGIBLE CANDIDATESIt takes a pretty nuanced “strict” reading to get Jordan Brocious in and still keep out Camacho.
If you really want to do a strict reading, you should consult the UAW constitution.Charlie Eaton would not be eligible because he was not a worker in and around the workplace when he signed up (or at any time thereafter).
ARTICLE 6Section 2.a”The applicant must, at the time of application, be an actual worker in and around the workplace.”
Sorry Charlie.